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Introduction 
My diagnosis came from a doctor at Massachusetts General Hospital in August, 2010. 
She asked about my family and my love life, pinched my skin and prodded my scars, took 
copious notes, and then wrote up a thorough report with her verdict: Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome, 
a genetic collagen deficiency. The diagnosis was no real surprise—my sister, 12 years my 
elder, was diagnosed by the same doctor a year or so earlier. Her EDS had progressed beyond 
my condition at the time—her chronic joint pain, “stretchy” skin, and immunodeficiency were 
much more pronounced and took a more significant toll on her daily life. Our doctor, 
however, could not be more pleased with her recent findings: as a geneticist, having siblings 
present with similar symptoms at varying stages of severity was a goldmine of study fodder. 
Until August 2010, Ehlers-Danlos looked like this: day-long (or more) pain after 
particularly strenuous exercise, scars that look like cigarette paper, “showing off” veins that 
bulge despite my non-muscular stature, skin that stretches further off my muscles than most, 
and limbs that bend awkwardly. A few weeks after my 18th birthday, my lung collapsed 
spontaneously. Later that year, I was diagnosed with Ulcerative Colitis, the kind of gastro-
intestinally-based immunodeficiency often associated with EDS. For the years before and 
nearly a decade after, I simply considered myself an unlucky but relatively typical Ashkenazi 
Jew (I was often told that, “yeah, this sort of thing is common in white skinny Jewish boys”). 
But now there was a name for all of this, a doctor’s report, and an entry on the online medical 
reference, WebMD. 
Efforts to quantify the body and self through the use of personal devices and 
services—efforts which are increasingly considered valid and valuable in medicine—are 
creating a new kind of relationship between ourselves and our medicalized conditions, one 
that leads to an exploitation of the self by corporate and regulatory bodies alike. I seek here to 
elucidate these exploitations through an autoethnographic pursuit that reveals the proprietary 
and arbitrary nature of the translations one relies on to make decisions in one’s life using 
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quantified self devices. I use resources at my disposal as an artist, technologist, and scholar to 
consider questions of the hegemony of measurement and language, what it means to be in 
pain, and—most importantly—how one might reclaim our body from what I will demonstrate 
as a strongly neoliberal conceptualization of the self. 
What follows is an exploration of my disease as seen through two self-health products 
built upon systems which collect and interpret data about the individual using them: 23andMe 
and the Fitbit Flex wristband. The project is informed by methodologies of visual and digital 
ethnography. The former, as outlined by Sarah Pink (2001), includes “the use of visual images 
in research and representation” (p. 31). And while the latter, per Pink et al. can incorporate the 
same methodologies as the former, it is complicated by the fact that digital technologies allow 
the ethnographer opportunities for mediation as well as observation (2015, p. 3). My project is 
further complicated by the fact that what is being looked at is not in itself visual 
representation, but a breaking-down of the technology used for that representation alongside a 
context of how that technology is designed, developed, and sold. As such, I utilize both code 
studies—wherein computer code is considered a “mechanical device for the production and 
consumption of verbal signs” (Aarseth, 1997, p. 21)—and material culture studies, understood 
by Pink et al. as based on an argument. The argument is: 
“That objects and things, the materials used to construct them and the properties of 
these materials are central to understanding culture and social relations: humans play 
as much of a role in the creation of objects as objects create the conditions of human 
life” (2015, p. 61). 
All of this is being done in the service of subverting the biopolitical hegemony exercised by 
an assemblage of actors developing, designing, and selling products that purport to help me 
find the “one unique [me]” (“23andMe”, n.d.-b) or to “find [my] fit” (“Why Fitbit”, n.d.). At 
the outset, then, it is important to establish an understanding of what element of “me” I seek 
to explore. 
Per Parapia and Jackson, individuals with (the yet-to-be-named) Ehlers-Danlos 
Syndrome were identified as far back as 400 BCE, when Hippocrates described a specific type 
of bleeding and bruising in his subjects (2008, p. 32). Twenty-five hundred years later, Edvard 
Ehlers (1901) and Henri-Alexandre Danlos (1908) began to connect formally the diagnosis of 
the condition to its symptoms: “lax joints, hyper-extensible skin and a tendency to bruising” 
(Parapia & Jackson, 2008, p. 32) and other various connective-tissue anomalies—all 
conditions that can be observed by a close physical exam (as opposed to being identified via, 
for instance, a blood test). Even after the genetic markers for EDS were recognized in the 
1960s, EDS is still a disease diagnosed through observation and touch (“What is Ehlers-
Danlos”, n.d.). 
If the disease is, in fact, hereditary, it follows that “seeing” one’s genetic variants 
would reveal the presence of Ehelers-Danlos in oneself. This, then, is where my project 
begins: seeing the disease. What ethnographic methods are available to observe the presence 
of EDS in a subject? As the MGH doctor already demonstrated, poking, prodding, and 
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interviewing are clinically sound approaches. But how might I discover, document, and 
understand a condition which is only barely perceptible to the trained eye? Corporations 
selling so called “quatified-self” devices or personal genomic services offer that their products 
will reveal insights not otherwise knowable or visible without the use their wares. 
An Introduction to 23andMe 
When I was diagnosed in 2010, Silicon Valley based 23andMe had already been 
collecting and genotyping human genetic samples for three years—though they were doing so 
at the prohibitively expensive price of $999 (Herper, 2011, para. 1). The company, which has 
received hundreds of millions of dollars in private investment (“23andMe”, n.d.-a), collects 
saliva samples from its customers via the mail and uses those samples to genotype each 
customer’s DNA. For some time, the resulting charts and graphs would include probabilities 
of being diagnosed with certain diseases (cancer, diabetes, et al.), chances of going bald, 
certain genetically determined physical traits, and other various facts (ancestry data, for 
instance) (Murphy, 2013). In late 2013, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration filed an 
injunction that prohibited the company from making disease-related predictions, though 
23andMe and the FDA eventually agreed that reports could include carrier status and ancestry 
data (Ouellette, 2015). Under the Trump administration, the FDA loosened its regulations on 
how the company markets its “Health + Ancestry” kits, which, in late 2017, cost $199 (you 
can purchase an “Ancestry Only” kit for $49) (Keshavan, 2017). The kits act as a loss 
leader—the company believes that building as large a database as possible of genomic data 
will lead to profitability. Indeed, in early 2015, the biopharmaceutical giant, Genentech, paid 
$60 million for access to the genetic data of those “spitters” who opted-in to have their 
genome shared (at the time of the deal, that was 600,000 of 800,000 customers) (Herper, 
2015; Ouellette, 2015). 
In each human, one cell’s nucleus contains a three billion unit string of genetic data. 
Each unit on the string is a nucleobase represented by an A (adenine), C (cytosine), G 
(guanine), or T (thymine). Of those three billion or so bases, only ten million vary between 
individual humans; that is, 99.67% of our genetic data is identical to every other human. The 
ten million bases that vary, or single nucleotide polymorphisms, contain our genotype: the 
DNA data that affects how one looks or what diseases manifest in one’s body and so on. In an 
evolutionary biological sense, our genotype is what makes us “different” from one another. 
As of 2015, 23andMe's technology revealed the genotype of just over 600,000 SNPs 
(“Genotyping technology”, 2015). 
My Experience with 23andMe 
Understanding the technical details of 23andMe’s offering is critical to my project, 
especially as I consider the marketing rhetoric surrounding the product. On the 23andMe 
homepage for prospective customers (as opposed to those who have already spit), one learns 
that the company is “an experience that lets [customers] explore [their] genetics throughout 
[their lives]” and that “it’s just saliva” that makes the service work. The company promises to 
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reveal the “one unique you” (“23andMe”, n.d.-b). On the “spitter”-facing site, those of us who 
have sent our DNA to the company (I did so in the summer of 2014) are presented with the 
lab-chic aesthetic of biomedical information design: simple in form and color, the work 
includes an integration of iconography with an emphasis on the graphical, rather than the 
textual, to convey a communicative goal, be it empirical observation, narrative, or 
instruction.1Pie graphs tell us the probability that I have dark hair or how likely it is that I 
consume more caffeine than the average 23andMe customer; ancestry maps connect me back 
to Neanderthals (via http://you.23andMe.com/ with a username and password). 
Reviewing 23andMe’s marketing-speak alongside the technology behind its service 
highlights two poles on a spectrum: the colorful (literally) excitement of our results acting as 
the interface to the banality of saliva on a microchip. The data underlying the company’s 
inspirational rhetoric and seductive data visualizations can be described using Mathew Fuller 
and Andrew Goffey’s (2012) “grayness,” a concept they adapt from Primo Levi’s description 
of ambiguous internal politics in Nazi Lagers into a way to frame functionally banal 
technology. In their 2012 Evil Media, they write of grayness as, “A quality that is easily 
overlooked, and that is what gives it its great attraction, an unremarkableness that can be of 
inestimable value in background operations” (p. 11). The 23andMe designers, then, have 
taken the unremarkableness of one’s genetic data and dressed it in the excitement of an early-
21st century biomedical startup. 
Downloading and opening my 23andMe “raw data” file, I find 610,546 lines of text. 
On each line is tab-delimited data: an rsid (unique SNP identifiers), a chromosome label (1 
thru 23, X, Y), a number representing the position of each SNP on my chromosome, and its 
genotype (a usually two-letter combination of A, G, T, and C). Considering my relatively new 
classification as an individual with a genetic deficiency, my immediate instinct is to seek out 
proof of my Ehlers-Danlosian status. I choose one of a handful of online genotype references, 
snpedia.com, and search for Ehlers-Danlos. The resulting page (“Ehlers-Danlos syndrome”, 
2016) tells me that “EDS is caused by a defect in the structure, production, or processing of 
collagen or proteins that interact with collagen, such as mutations in the COL5A or COL3A 
genes” (para. 1). 23andMe allows you to search your data by gene through their online “raw 
data” interface, so I do this. Too many SNPs are listed to go through each one and find where 
my EDS is; the hints I do find seem too enigmatic to a non-geneticist such as myself. 
Delving into their “gray media” concept, Fuller and Goffey are sure to point out that 
grayness does not indicate media which bears “some sort of hidden meaning that might be 
brought to light…but a certain recessiveness is often a crucial aspect of their efficacy” (2012, 
p. 12). The authors highlight this recessiveness as critical to their study and I will do the same 
here. Gray media is obfuscating: the rows and rows of text—be they genetic data, encrypted 
hex values (as I will demonstrate below), or the lines of code which generate these corpora—
are not meant to be read by humans. They are banal in their obtuseness, lulling the brain that 
tries to read them into giving up. These are, to be sure, defense mechanisms; like the 
cephalopod’s chromatic camouflage, gray media stays unread as long as it is unreadable. 
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The Quantified Self 
Keeping raw data and proprietary algorithms hidden as often as possible is key to 
protecting the intellectual property and “value-add” provided by corporations which sell 
products and services relating to the “quantified self”, or QS, movement.2 The quantified self 
refers to the use of technology to track someone’s activity, health, or other personal metrics in 
order to improve upon quality of life. With roots in self-experimentation and self-science, the 
QS movement as understood today is built upon miniaturized electronic sensors—motion, 
temperature, and so on—embedded in consumer devices. This miniaturization requirement is 
critical to understanding why the market for these devices has grown exponentially in the past 
decade, especially alongside the development of high-density, cheap, and fast connected-
storage technologies (often referred to colloquially as “the cloud”). When a device can log 
every minute movement, those data are relatively useless if they cannot be calculated and 
stored centrally. The same can be said for logging and interpreting 600,000 genotypes for over 
one million “spitters”.3 
Until 2016, the majority of writing on QS was short-form—primarily works espousing 
the possibilities that the use of self-tracking devices and services brought to the fore. At the 
CHI 2014 conference, a group from the University of Washington, along with a number of 
researchers at Microsoft Corporation, produced “a qualitative and quantitative analysis of 52 
video recordings of Quantified Self Meetup talks to understand what [participants] did, how 
they did it, and what they learned” (Choe, Lee, Lee, Pratt, & Kientz, 2014, p. 1143). Self-
proclaimed “Technology Futurist and Academic Researcher” Melanie Swan published a 
number of papers between 2009 and 2015 which offer ways that the use of quantified self 
devices will “disrupt” (2013) or “crowdsource” (2012a; 2012b) health data . Professor in 
Communication at the University of Canberra in Australia, Deborah Lupton, has been 
similarly prolific, bringing a more academically-minded and sociological approach to 
researching the movement (2013; 2014; 2015). 
By the end of 2016, however, a number of long-form scholarly works were published, 
each providing a range of theoretical and ethnographic explorations into QS. This collection 
includes Self-Tracking (2016) by a pair of American researchers, Gina Neff and Dawn Nafus, 
and The Quantified Self: A Sociology of Self Tracking (2016) by Lupton. These came on the 
heels of the Nafus-edited Quantified: Biosensing Technologies in Everyday Life (2016), an 
anthology of essays on self-tracking through varied lenses such as the social sciences, 
journalism, industry, and cultural studies. While these works are not necessarily historical in 
nature, they do note a relatively recent shift in a focus from “n of 1” studies—that is, tracking 
one’s own data for the purpose of one’s own improvement—into a more collective approach 
(measuring an individual’s data against an entire customer base, for instance). Lupton (2016) 
writes of a move to the “quantified us”, quoting a 2014 blog post by design consultants 
Matthew Jordan and Nikki Pfarr: “One of the ways…to have more impact [with QS], is to 
bridge the gap between Big [sic] and small data, and to heighten the collective relevance of 
the data we track about ourselves” (as cited in Lupton, 2016, p. 131). 
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The economics of scale provided by corporate QS systems and products, then, help 
make the data generated “valuable”: albeit paradoxically, the quantified self depends on the 
actions of many others for “proper” scientific gains. In his 1981 article, “Self-
Experimentation: A Call for Change,” Allen Neuringer writes that in self-science, “as in 
science generally, progress depends upon the interaction between individual experimenters: to 
generate background information and hypotheses, to check results, to provide missing pieces 
for the puzzle” (p. 92). Thus, even though the quantified self movement was, for all intents 
and purposes, launched as just that—a movement—rather than “an industry”, as Choe et al. 
note, barriers to finding value in the practices therein include the time, tools, and skills 
necessary to collect and analyze the data (p. 1143). These are all problems which corporate 
financing and market-based strategies can address. 
Of course, there are problematics associated with the QS movement before or after the 
aforementioned barriers are overcome. It is not difficult to imagine some of these issues, 
especially in the case of 23andMe: a misinterpretation by corporate or consumer party, 
leading to taking drastic action (e.g., mastectomy in a perceived high-cancer-risk individual); 
an unauthorized third-party gaining access to one’s DNA; or an authorized third-party using 
the data for surveillant4 or nefarious purposes (denying insurance to a child due to her parent’s 
carrier status). However, while these dystopian scenarios are certainly troubling, it is more 
productive to consider the greater power at work here. 
In his essay, “How Should We Do the History of Statistics?”, Ian Hacking (1991) 
highlights the bureaucratic power of statistics by referencing Michel Foucault’s bio-power, or 
the state’s control and discipline over the body: 
“One need not subscribe fully to this model [i.e., bio-power] to see that statistics of 
populations and of deviancy form an integral part of the industrial state. Such a 
politics is directly involved in capital formation through social assurance…” (p. 183). 
Continuing on this theme, Hacking uses Marx’s utilization of statistics in his own work when 
pointing out how statistical bureaucracy had changed the state: “It is a glib but true 
generalization that proletarian revolutions have never occurred in any state whose assurantial5 
technology was working properly” (p. 184). Hacking’s piece was written around the same 
time as the publication of his larger work, The Taming of Chance (1990), which provides a 
more thorough investigation into the erosion of determinism and emergence of statistical 
powers of the state. But his essay is a good starting point from which to begin to consider the 
hegemony of statistics and how the grayness of large bodies of data may not only obfuscate to 
protect, but also to project an ora of truth. That is, if the file I download from 23andMe is too 
large to parse through myself, then the data within must be valid. As Chris Anderson offers, 
albeit facetiously, in a 2008 article in Wired, “With enough data, the numbers speak for 
themselves” (para. 7). 
Another paradox presents itself: in QS-inspired “dashboards”—webpages with an 
overview of one’s collected data, abstracted and interpreted to be most relevant to one’s goals 
and motives—one finds the aforementioned seductive data visualizations. These graphs and 
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charts are, purportedly, based on the troves of data sitting in a company’s database. The visual 
properties of the graphics, however, provide users with an abstraction that both makes the data 
more relatable and comprehensible than rows of numbers in a spreadsheet or database (see 
Neff & Nafus, 2016, p. 82; Kennedy & Hill, 2017, p. 2). 
We are, then, at once seduced by the reductively simple and the overwhelmingly 
complex. And within this paradox sits our condition: our carrier status, our daily activity 
levels, our pulse, blood pressure, or weight. But who are the individuals who decide what to 
collect, how to interpret it, and in what form to display it? I wish to liken these individuals—
product designers, developers, marketers, investors, and so on—to Elaine Scarry’s “torturers” 
as they turn a feeling or condition into something seen or heard, make it real, and take 
advantage of its apparent state. In her 1985 The Body in Pain, she writes: 
“If the felt-attributes of pain are (through one means of verbal objectification or 
another) lifted into the visible world, and if the referent for these now objectified 
attributes is understood to be the human body, then the sentient fact of the person’s 
suffering will become knowable to the second person” (1985, p. 13). 
These torturers translate the intangible into the tangible, forcing its reconstruction in a purely 
visible form, giving us reason to doubt when a visualization may not adequately represent, to 
treat when a threshold is misplaced. Hacking (1990) shares a similar sentiment: 
“The erosion of determinism and the taming of chance by statistics does not introduce 
a new liberty. The argument that indeterminism creates a place for free will is a hollow 
mockery. The bureaucracy of statistics imposes not just by creating administrative 
rulings but by determining classifications within which people must think of 
themselves and of the actions that are open to them” (p. 194). 
Once the bureaucracy of statistics is imposed, its subjects are objectified and normalized. 
They are stripped of agency and noted as a record in a database with millions of others. 
My Process & Output 
I return, then, to my search for proof of EDS within my 23andMe data. If I understand 
the larger implications of how power acts on me as a subject of 23andMe, why consent to 
having my DNA genotyped? Partly, I opted to send my saliva off to Northern California as 
research because I knew I could not critique a service from which I abstained. More 
importantly—and more difficult to admit—is that I harbored enough curiosity to submit 
(perhaps my two reasons are not that different from one another). Scarry (1985), once again, 
spoke to me: “To have pain is to have certainty,” she writes, “To hear about pain is to have 
doubt” (p. 7). After years of feeling as though there was something “different” about my 
body, I could finally “prove” it. 
There was not much proof to be had—not, at least, in my 23andMe raw data file. The 
abstracted graphics on the 23andMe site proved even further from valuable: I did learn that I 
have the muscles of a sprinter (as opposed to a long-distance runner) without any warning of 
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the long-term damage that said sprinting might do to my joints and tendons. I decided that, if 
23andMe’s version of the quantified self wouldn’t indicate something critical which I already 
knew about myself, then perhaps I could express myself using my quantified self. 
Neff and Nafus (2016) reference projects that “Satisfy aesthetic curiosity” (p. 80)—
projects made by artists using data from their quantified-selves. These projects include Laurie 
Frick’s “Frick Bits” (2014–2017) which use GPS data to create abstract patterns, as well as 
Stephen Cartwright’s (1996–1997, 1999–ongoing) sculptural representations of his latitude, 
longitude, and elevation data. As Smith and Vonthethoff (2015) explain, some users of 
quantified self devices wish to go beyond the “self-knowledge” promised and instead 
construct narratives that can be shared in public space via the commonality of data (p. 12). I, 
however, was more interested in how I might be able to translate the data in a manner that 
would highlight its arbitrary and proprietary nature. 
Putting 23andMe on hold for a bit, I began considering all of the devices and services 
available on the consumer market that would allow me to collect raw data. At the top of this 
list was the Fitbit—a wrist-worn motion tracker whose primary measure, “steps”, has become 
a standard metric for most entry-level QS devices. If I sought out the existence of my Ehlers-
Danlos Syndrome in my genetic data, certainly a device that measures my movement would 
help me “see” the reasons for my pain; my joints and muscles are loose and relatively slow to 
recover from trauma, often the loci of significant pain. Delving into my Fitbit data, then, made 
a great deal of sense. Secondly, Fitbit data is semiotically further from its referent than a 
service like 23andMe. Whereas genetic data represents a relatively widely accepted 
nomenclature (that is, the A, C, T, and G that makes up DNA), Fitbit “steps” are mostly 
engineered by the Fitbit Corporation. As such, I proposed, the data collected here would not 
be necessarily readable in the same way that 23andMe raw data was. 
I was correct. Per the Fitbit website (though only in the Fitbit customer support 
section), the base Fitbit model (at the time of my initiating this project, this was the "Flex") 
uses one accelerometer—a silicon chip that can sense movement—which measures on three 
axes (“How does my Fitbit”, n.d.). As the device is moved, Fitbit’s software determines if a 
step has been taken. It then extrapolates the number of calories expended and distance 
traveled. This data is sent via Bluetooth, a wireless technology, to a smartphone or computer 
in an encrypted format using hex data—individual base-16 values equating to 0 through 255.6 
Software on the smartphone or computer then uploads this data to the Fitbit corporate servers, 
which are loaded with software to decode these hex values and store step, calorie, and 
distance data. 
  After wearing the Fitbit for a number of days, I began using software on my 
computer to intercept the raw data being communicated between the device and software on 
my laptop via Bluetooth. What I saw was a long list of base-16 values. These values, 
however, were not raw step data, perse. Instead, they were messages being sent in encrypted 
hex values—numbers being transmitted after being scrambled, only properly unscrambled via 
possession of a secret software-based key that exists on the Fitbit servers. After data was 
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transferred from my wrist to my laptop, it was uploaded to those servers to be interpreted and 
added via database records. I could go to Fitbit.com and download a spreadsheet with the 
interpreted values (steps taken, minutes of sleep, minutes of strenuous walking, etc.), but 
nowhere could I procure the actual motion data collected by the accelerometers in the 
wristband. 
In fact, this was exactly the scenario I was hoping for. By intercepting encrypted hex 
values, my step data lost all context. By definition, as digital data, the hex represented a set of 
numerical values which, in turn, could be used by any other program on any computer as long 
as that program was instructed to interpret data in the format I fed it.7 For example, a basic 
computer image is made up of an array of pixels, each with three values—red, green, and 
blue—that range from 0 to 255. This system allows for millions of “RGB” combinations. 
Placing millions of those RGB combinations into a grid results in an image. In order to turn 
the step data into an array of pixels to form an image, I simply needed to arrange my Fitbit 
data in a specific pattern to convince my computer that it made up an image file. After one 
month of wearing and downloading data from the Fitbit, I had over 70,000 bytes with which I 
could build an image 88 x 268 pixels in size (see figure 1). 
Figure 1 
Image Description: Bitmap image 
made using Fitbit raw data. Each 
pixel is three sets of hexadecimal 
values, resulting in a seemingly 
random, but colorful pattern. 
 
The image in figure 1 is, of course, nothing more than an array of three color pixels—
the same as any image taken with a digital camera or scanned into a computer. The only true 
difference between figure 1 and those images is that the arrangement of pixels in those images 
make sense to the human brain. One recognizes patterns and sees their grandmother in the 
photo. In figure 1, I demonstrate the movement that a Fitbit measured from my wrist over the 
course of 30 days. Is this an any more “true” representation of me than the decoded step data 
uploaded via the Fitbit program on my laptop? Does it provide any more insight into my EDS 
than the line graph tracking my sleep cycles on Fitbit.com? It does not. 
A number of my colleagues, when presented with figure 1, offered that I had 
“abstracted” the data, but I disagree. The hex data represented in the 23,584 pixels of figure 1 
are no more concrete or abstract than the values which I had intercepted from the Fitbit—they 
are, in fact, the same exact values. Instead, what I seek to do with a piece such as this is to 
highlight the abstract nature of the metric being collected in the first place. Who decides what 
a “step” is? How do they identify a “lightly active” versus “fairly active” versus “very active” 
step? On a weather forecast, raindrops are present when the chance of precipitation is only 
greater than a certain threshold—in this case, what threshold delineates between “red” calories 
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burned, “yellow” calories burned, and “green” calories burned?8 I experimented with other 
forms: an audio file (that sounded much like the noise machine in a therapist’s office), a 
design in virtual 3D space (figure 2), and a 3D print (figure 3), all of which were built using 
my Fitbit hex values arranged in different patterns (though in the same order) and surrounded 
by different meta, or instructional, code. And all of which are useless as a means of training or 
diagnosis, but also completely valueless to those who may want to appropriate my condition 
for their gain.    
Figure 2 
Image Description: A thick line traces in three-
dimensions in a computer graphic generated by Fitbit 
data. Each angle in the link represents a set of three 





Image Description: Resulting 3D print of 
Figure 2 graphic. The lack of proper 
structural elements such as support posts 
means that the plastic filament produced a 





Inherent Contradictions Within the Quantified Self 
I have already reviewed a number of paradoxical qualities of the quantified self 
movement: the simultaneous focus on self and aggregate and the reductivity of dashboards 
atop the complexity of datasets. One more glaring contradiction must be highlighted here, 
however. While quantifying the self is a practice that may trace back centuries (Neuringer, 
1981) or even millennia (Swan, 2013), contemporary popular culture’s recent foray into the 
movement is often credited to an informal meeting of 28 individuals at the home of Kevin 
Kelly. Kelly, a noted neoliberal technologist, was also founding editor of WIRED Magazine 
and author of New Rules for the New Economy (1999) (“History of the Quantified Self”, n.d.). 
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It is no surprise, then, that so much of the quantified self discourse represents neoliberal 
tenets: remember 23andMe’s consumer-facing homepage with its reminder that there are “23 
pairs of chromosomes. One unique you.” Or Fitbit’s “Why Fitbit” page (n.d.) telling you to 
“Find your fit” and that “Only Fitbit gives you the freedom to get fit your way.” Deborah 
Lupton (2016) agrees: “Self-tracking,” she writes (p. 68), “Represents the apotheosis of the 
neoliberal entrepreneurial citizen ideal.” Neoliberalism, as David Harvey (2005) notes in A 
Brief History of Neoliberalism,  
“requires technologies of information creation and capacities to accumulate, store, 
transfer, analyse, and use massive databases to guide decisions in the global 
marketplace. Hence neoliberalism’s intense interest in and pursuit of information 
technologies (leading some to proclaim the emergence of a new kind of ‘information 
society’)” (p. 3-4). 
It seems there is no better place for the neoliberal self to plan its success than in the 
quantified self movement. And yet, with all of the emphasis on the individual and their 
autonomy within neoliberal discourse, the quantified self depends highly on the aggregate. 
Further, an innate trust is required before sending one’s spit off to a laboratory or uploading 
one’s minute movements to an anonymous datacenter. For those with an ideological belief in 
the sovereignty of the self, neoliberals are extremely eager to hand that self over to other 
parties in order to become one in millions of other database records. 
Resolving this contradiction requires a return to Ian Hacking, though this time in his 
much broader work, The Taming of Chance (1990). In the introduction to a chapter entitled 
“The Autonomy of Statistical Law,” Hacking quotes Francis Galton, English Victorian 
scientist, mathematician, and father of eugenics. During a speech to the Royal Institution in 
London in 1877, Galton discusses normal distributions—statistical samples which fall in a 
predictable bell-curve—in relation to evolution. He speaks of “the ordinary genealogical 
course of race” and how outliers die “away at the margins…the scanty remnants of all 
exceptional members…revert to…mediocrity” (cited in Hacking, 1990, p. 180). Statistical 
laws, Galton says: 
“Show us that natural selection does not act by carving out each new generation, 
according to a definite pattern on a Procrustean bed, irrespective of waste. They also 
explain how small a contribution is made to future generations by those who deviate 
widely from the mean, either in excess or deficiency, and they enabled us to discover 
the precise sources when the deficiencies in the produce of exceptional types are 
supplied, and their relative contributions” (cited in Hacking, 1990, p.180). 
Hacking begins his chapter with this passage in order to illustrate how the laws governing 
statistics extend beyond prediction into explanation—that is, it becomes easy to observe a 
statistical data set and see cause rather than recommendation (p. 182). If natural selection 
expects a regression to the mean (or, in the parlance of Francis Galton, a reversion to 
mediocrity), then both the deficient and exceptional must be jettisoned. Normalization as 
survival of the fittest, one of neoliberalism’s most important ideologies and, in this context, a 
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pitch-perfect example of Foucauldian biopower. 
Neff and Nafus resist the use of biopower in an evaluation of the quantified self: 
“While we take the [Foucauldian] scholarship seriously, the clinical view is not an 
unreasonable one. It argues better decisions are made, physiologically speaking, when 
standard medical knowledge—the outcome of collective empiricism—is disseminated 
through the use of self-tracking devices” (2016, p. 52). 
Their use of “collective empiricism” here refers to a concept from historians of science 
Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison as the pair explain a nineteenth century drive towards an 
unbiased, objective observer in science (Neff & Nafus, 2016, p. 50). Placing the type of data 
collection and analysis necessary for the success of consumer QS devices in the realm of 
collective empiricism, however, reveals a reliance on statistical technologies that normalize 
(the bell curve, regression, et al.). As disability studies scholar Lennard Davis (2006) writes, 
“The average man, the body of the man in the middle, becomes the exemplar of the middle 
way of life” (p. 5). 
Pain, on the other hand, is exceptional. Chronic illness is an outlier. And to be sure, 
Neff and Nafus do not deny this. In their account of Nafus’s use of a Fitbit during her 
rehabilitation from a knee injury, the authors reveal (2016, p. 41) that “she decided that 3,000 
steps was an appropriate level of activity for someone with her type of disability”—drastically 
lower than the 10,000 step standard preprogrammed into every Fitbit device. They go on to 
note that, in their research, the Fitbit user who had not had an injury in recent years was the 
outlier. Injuries and disabilities are conditions, however, that resist the mean, and, as such 
resist expression in systems where regression is favored. “Whatever pain achieves,” writes 
Elaine Scarry, “it achieves in part through its unsharability, and it ensures this unsharability 
through its resistance to language” (1985, p. 4). The standard off-the-shelf Fitbit or 23andMe 
package has no language to express a condition such as Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome. It becomes 
the role of the diagnosed to find a means to express their situation. 
Viewed through the lens of an ethnographic practice, however, supplementing data-
collection with self-reporting is nearly a requirement. As anthropologist Rosemary Blake 
(2011) writes: 
“The view of the researcher as necessarily subjective has led to the practice of 
reflexive extrapolations within ethnographic writing becoming almost an ethical 
requirement (Clifford and Marcus 1986) whereby anthropologists write against the 
representation of the anthropologist as all-knowing and unbiased. Formerly taken-for-
granted notions of knowledge have come under scrutiny with anthropologists such as 
Michael Jackson using a focus on experience to challenge the notions of ‘determinant 
systems of knowledge’ (Jackson 1995: 160) espoused in positivist disciplines and 
sometimes implicit in the anthropological enterprise” (2011, sec. 2, para. 4). 
Is there a more positivist practice than the quantified self movement? Rarely, if ever, can one 
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find a “subjective” practitioner in the rhetoric of QS products and services. Instead, the 
emphasis is on the autonomous self, using the tools at their disposal to achieve “success” 
through some sort of quantifiable “experience”. 
Further, an ethnographic practice that takes into account that multi-modal 
representations of the same information will strengthen resistance against the positivist 
disciplines. If, as Scarry writes, pain (and, by extension, other conditions nearly imperceptible 
by the QS devices and services) resists language, then our ethnographers must do all they can 
to liberate that pain outside of traditional language. Documentation of pain or illness will not 
relieve it biologically. But does the subject seek relief? 
Returning to my own condition, I do not. I am fully aware that the way I sit, the way I 
walk, the things I carry, the frequency with which I carry them—all of these and more will 
effect the pain I feel. I could track my movements and more with a Fitbit or a notebook or a 
spreadsheet. I could pinpoint exactly how many pounds I lift in a day or how many steps I 
take and then try to correlate this to how intense my pain is the next day or longer. Remember, 
however, that the expression of pain in a means exploitable by the torturer threatens our 
patient’s subjectivity—something I value more than the relief of the pain itself. 
Conclusion 
This work is part of a larger project focused on questions of the medicalized self, with 
a distinct direction towards unsettling the power held by statistics and language, both pillars 
of the quantified self movement. These pillars are important in building a case for certitude: if 
it looks and sounds true, it must be. Ethnographic filmmaker, Paul Stoller writes: 
“[Jean] Rouch used a "cruel" epistemological acrobatics to tack between the sensible 
and the intelligible. Perhaps the way to the future of the human sciences is to follow 
Rouch's "cruel" path and confront the sometimes inspiring, sometimes fearsome world 
of incertitude” (2010, p. 133). 
It is quite likely that Stoller’s vision of an uncertain sciences is just as utopian as the privacy 
warnings surrounding the QS movement are dystopian. As an artist and scholar, I am willing 
to heed both visions. 
Tremain (2006) argued that, “Technologies of normalization facilitate the systematic 
creation, identification, classification, and control of social anomalies by which some subjects 
can be divided from others” (p. 186). This is an excellent summary of why products like 
23andMe and Fitbit—products that rely heavily on the normalizing technologies of statistics 
such as the bell curve—must be understood through the lens of biopower. Later in her piece, 
Tremain reminds the reader that it is dangerous to focus so closely on an individualized 
conception of the disabled person, especially as neoliberalism attempts to use individualism as 
a smoke-screen for biopolitical control. The kind of reclamation of the self through subversion 
of QS devices that I propose and attempt here must be seen, then, as a collective goal—not the 
exercise of downloading and translating Fitbit or 23andMe data, per se, but the understanding 
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of QS as problematic that comes as a result of this exercise. I offer these Fitbit “hacks” as a 
starting point to the same sorts of actions taken by the feminist self-health movements of the 
70s and those of the AIDS activists in the 80s, and 90s:9 the former preached self-
experimentation and exploration (Ruzek, 1978) while the latter argued for inclusion in public 
health discourse through better knowledge of how that discourse operates (Epstein, 1996). 
Especially in the case of the AIDS movement, finding transparency in the systems of medical 
research and pharmaceutical development was of critical importance for its success (Epstein, 
1996). It is my hope that the opaque and surveillant nature of the quantified self movement 
that I have demonstrated will inspire a shift away from the willingness with which bodies—
both disabled and not—are offered to corporations promising knowledge and freedom. 
Gabi Schaffzin is a PhD Candidate in Art History, Theory, & Criticism, Art Practice 
concentration at UC San Diego. His work is focused on the emergence and design of pain 
quantification in the computation culture of the Cold War era, tracing that emergence into the 
pain quantifying and visualizing mechanisms used today in clinical and self-health practices. 
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Endnotes 
1.  The preceding describes marketing copy and imagery from the 23andMe.com homepage in 
May 2016. A review of past homepages—possible via the Wayback Machine at archive.org—
reveals that the basic message (“one unique you”) has not changed drastically in the decade 
since the website first launched. 
2.  I use the lowercase “quantified self” here, as opposed to “Quantified Self”, as to delineate 
between a broad cultural phenomenon and a branding effort on the part of its progenitors and 
device manufacturers. 
3.  It is, perhaps, a bit controversial to include 23andMe as a product used in the same vein as 
other quantified self devices and services. On the one hand, the service collects, interprets, 
and displays a user’s data for the purpose of making changes towards a healthier lifestyle. On 
the other, the data will never change, and so it does not necessarily allow for “self-tracking”. 
As the primary “material” of this project is data, the categorizing of 23andMe as a quantified 
self service makes sense. 
4.  See 2017 reports that police can request data from services such as 23andMe. 
5.  Hacking here uses the term assurantial to refer to “what Daniel Defert calls a technologie 
assurentiel which has to do with providing [or, assuring] a stable social order” (Hacking, 
1990, p. 183) 
6.  Base-16 numbers are represented by 1-9 and A-F, allowing for digits which represent 1-16. 
Just like in base-10, which is the system with which is most familiar, multiply the left-most 
digit by 16 and add to the value of the digits to the right, and so on. For example, 11 = 17, AA 
= 170. As such, the system can store values ranging from 0 to 255 in just two characters. 
7.  Every modern computing system is driven by technology which interprets base-16 values 
as “commands”. 
8.  Fitbit’s online dashboard changes the color of your calorie burn value based on how many 
you have burned—from red (low) to yellow to green (high). 
9.  While the literature on both of these is extensive, for a good starting point, see The 
Women’s Health Movement: Feminist Alternatives to Medical Control by Sheryl Burt Ruzek 
(1978) and Steve Epstein’s Impure Science: AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge 
(1996). 
